The Perils of TV Legal Punditry by Arenella, Peter
University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1998 | Issue 1 Article 3
The Perils of TV Legal Punditry
Peter Arenella
Peter.Arenella@chicagounbound.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal Forum
by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arenella, Peter () "The Perils of TV Legal Punditry," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1998: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1998/iss1/3
The Perils of TV Legal Punditry
Peter Arenellat
In Woody Allen's "Deconstructing Harry," we learn that the
Devil has reserved a special place in Hell for all the "TV lawyers."
Allen's line and the knowing laughs it triggers should serve as a
warning to this growing cottage industry that something is amiss.
The first signs of serious trouble came with O.J. Simpson's civil
case. Since the trial was not televised, only a few pundits could
gain access to the courtroom or the media listening room. What did
lawyers and law professors across the country do when their local
television station asked them for "expert' analysis of that day's
developments? I hope and trust that many just said no. Far too
many lawyers, however, said yes and offered analysis of testimony
they didn't see and judicial rulings they hadn't read.
Things have only gone downhill since then. Reacting to the
Simpson case, most trial judges have refused to televise high-profile
trials in jurisdictions where they have the discretion to keep
cameras outside the courtroom.1  Consequently, nationally
prominent attorneys cannot observe these trials unless they are
willing to quit their day jobs and work full-time to cover them.
Lack of access to these trials has not, however, prevented many
celebrity pundits from "analyzing" these cases. On a Nightline
show covering the McVeigh trial, Ted Koppel asked a legal pundit
for her evaluation of the federal prosecutors' performance.' After
t Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law. BA.
Wesleyan University, 1969; J.D. Harvard University Law School, 1972. Special thanks to
Robert Goldstein for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
' See generally Peter Arenella, Televising High Profile Trials: Are We Better Off Pulling
The Plug?, 37 Santa Clara L Rev 879, 891-912 (1997), for arguments that recast the nature of
the debate about the benefits and costs of televising high profile trials. In that essay, I show
how the courtroom camera functions as a media filter that does not convey all aspects of the
trial to the viewing public. Id at 893-900. I also argue that the viewing public is not a mono-
lith but actually two different audiences - the "hard core" daily viewers and the far larger
public audience that primarily catches video snippets from the trial on evening programming.
Id at 900-01. Once this two-audience distinction is made, it becomes easier to see why many
of the benefits of televising high profile trials are realized primarily by daily trial watchers,
while serious costs result from the second audience's complete and unwitting dependence on
the television industry's judgments about which video snippets should be shown on evening
programming. Id at 893-912.
2 Nightline (ABC television broadcast, May 20, 1997).
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complimenting the prosecutors for presenting a tight case that
balanced technical detail with emotional appeals to the jurors, the
pundit candidly acknowledged that she had not been in the
courtroom. She, at least, felt obligated to inform the television
audience, albeit indirectly, that she was essentially repeating the
media's conventional wisdom about the case.
Many legal pundits are not so candid. Commentators who
evaluate the performance of trial lawyers they are not observing in
the courtroom perpetrate a fraud. Networks are willing
accomplices because their legal "infotainment" shows would have
very few guests and even fewer nationally recognizable
personalities if they only used local attorneys who actually
observed the trial. Ironically, television imposes a higher standard
of competency for its sports "color" analysts than its legal pundits.
After all, would the modern television audience take seriously the
expert analysis of some former athlete who was not actually
watching the game he or she was analyzing?
The recent controversy concerning the nature of the President's
relationship with Monica Lewinsky provides further evidence that
some pundits have let their egos and their politics trump their
professional judgement. Before Starr's report was released, you
could turn on any channel and find commentators relying on
rumor, hearsay, or unsubstantiated leaks from partisans, to
criticize or defend the actions of the special prosecutor, the
President and his legal team. Of course, some of these
commentators have reminded viewers they were only discussing
"allegations," not "facts." But the court of public opinion will render
a verdict about the truth and significance of these "allegations" that
will affect Starr's criminal investigation as well as the political
decision of whether to impeach the President. This uninformed
process of direct democracy in action would undoubtedly occur
without the legal commentators' participation. But should legal
pundits with various political axes to grind play such a significant
part in shaping that public opinion?
Have the legal commentariat lost their way or is this one more
example of legal demystification that demonstrates the absence of
any real separation between law and politics? If George Will gets
to play this game, why shouldn't prosecutors, defense counsel, and
law professors pontificate on television as well? Or should our role
as lawyers and "officers of the court" place some constraints on the
functions we serve, what we say, and how we say it'
' See Erwin Chemerinsky and Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator, 69
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As a media-certified member of the pundit community, I have
had ample opportunity to think about the TV legal expert's
legitimate functions and how best to serve them ethically by
learning from my mistakes. Some media requests for commentary
raise no* troubling issues. I am happy to cooperate if the media is
seeking an explanation of some legal institution, procedure, or issue
on which I have some expertise. After all, why shouldn't a former
criminal defense attorney who teaches and writes about the
criminal law use his knowledge to help the media describe and
explain the legal system's principles and procedures in ordinary
digestible English? Webster's Dictionary defines "pundit" as "a
learned man: teacher. 4 I am a teacher and the opportunity to
educate such a vast audience is hard to resist.
Such explanations of legal principles and procedures, however,
are the media's version of foreplay. What the media really wants to
know from its pundits is which lawyers are doing a good job, which
ones are screwing up, and which party will ultimately prevail in the
courtroom and in the court of public opinion. Responding to such
"scorecard" inquiries raises troubling questions about the pundit's
competence and ethics.
When pundits evaluate the performance of legal actors, predict
legal outcomes, and assess their accuracy and public acceptability,
they perform functions (for example, story-telling, and normative
analysis that assigns blame, credit, and responsibility) that permit
the media to attribute meaning to legal events while
simultaneously preserving the media's professional stance of
objectivity. The story-telling and normative-critique functions are
consistent with a second definition of "pundi": "one who gives
opinions in an authoritative manner: a critic."5 Glib and articulate
lawyers who talk in sound bites can give the media what it wants;
but should pundits refrain from doing so when they have no
adequate basis for their reviews? Even when lawyers observe the
legal proceedings they are "scoring," is something lost when pundits
help the media trivialize criminal investigations and trials into
sporting contests that entertain the masses? Finally, are there
some questions (for example, what will the jury do? did the jury act
in bad faith?) that pundits usually should not answer?
Neither the media nor many pundits see anything particularly
S Cal L Rev 1303, 1337-38 (1996); Erwin Chemerinsky and Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of
Being a Commentator H 37 Santa Clara L Rev 913, 915 (1997).
' Webster's Tenth New Collegiate Dictionary 947 (Merriam-Webster 1996). My friends
may balk at the "learned" characterization.
8 Id.
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problematic about offering this type of analysis. In their view, legal
pundits should not be held to a higher standard of competence and
expertise than the other "talking heads" who populate the
airwaves. The public knows what it is getting and has the freedom
to switch channels, stations, or articles if it is not interested. More
information and "critical analysis" are better than less because it
contributes to the "marketplace of ideas," thereby enhancing public
understanding of our legal system while subjecting its decision-
makers to greater democratic accountability.
This article paints a less rosy picture. Part I examines the
functions a legal pundit can serve and what pundits must know
and do to perform these roles competently. Once one realizes the
prerequisites for competent legal punditry, it becomes easier to see
why celebrity pundits add little value to the intellectual
marketplace when they analyze cases they are not observing.
But the perils of TV legal punditry go beyond the problem of
talking heads offering uninformed commentary. Any evaluation of
punditry's impact on our legal institutions and the public's
understanding of how our system functions must examine how well
pundits can serve their normative functions in a visual, "live,"
entertainment medium that relies on powerful video images, sound
bites, and polarized adversarial debates to communicate
information to its audience.
Part H suggests that the constraints of television as a medium
limit the educational benefits derived from TV legal punditry while
generating significant costs. Television legal pundits improve the
media's news gathering function and thereby contribute to the
public's understanding of some legal issues and procedures when
they competently perform their descriptive and explanatory
functions. When, however, they perform their storytelling and
normative critique functions by offering sound-bite analysis of
complex, nuanced problems, they frequently frame important
issues in a misleading fashion that generates unproductive and ill-
informed public discussions about pseudo-issues.
There are several dangers in my writing a polemic against TV
legal pundits when I continue to be one, albeit on rare occasions.
By doing this work, I might be tempted to inflate the significance of
TV punditry. Perhaps the viewing audience has already figured
out how much hot air passes for intelligent commentary and pays
little attention to any of it. Conversely, if TV legal punditry does
matter, the reader might view me as either a hypocrite or a self-
delusional egomaniac who mistakenly believes he can avoid all the
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pitfalls that come with the territory.
What follows, however, is the product of my efforts to define
the appropriate nature of the pundit's job by analyzing what rve
learned from my mistakes. I have struggled with these issues for
the last decade, especially during the Simpson saga when I worked
as an on-air legal consultant for ABC News. During the criminal
trial, I also did "gavel-to-gavel" television coverage every morning
for a local station, wrote a daily column in the Los Angeles Times,
and offered trial commentary on local and national radio news
stations. I learned first-hand that there were vast differences in
how the three mediums communicated information to their
audiences. In defining and redefining my job description, I hope I
have developed some insight into punditry's temptations and perils.
This essay draws upon those personal experiences.
I. TV LEGAL PUNDITRY'S FUNCTIONS
A. From Description to Prescription: The Pundits Changing Role
Legal punditry is not a new phenomenon, but the
commentators job description changed with the advent of Court TV
and the networks' discovery that some high profile trials had
commercial as well as news value. Legal experts from across the
country weighed in on the Goetz verdict and the prolonged
McMartin preliminary hearing that involved sensational
allegations of child abuse. Three televised high profile trials in Los
Angeles - Rodney King, the Menendez brothers, and the Simpson
case - increased the legal expert's prominence as he became a
constant "on-air" personality who provided ongoing analysis of the
case.
Realizing the public's seemingly insatiable appetite for
sensational criminal cases, television has called on celebrity
pundits to analyze the Oklahoma City bombing trials, the Nanny
trial in Massachusetts, the Unabomber case, and Starr's
investigation into alleged Presidential wrongdoing. Legal pundits
are now a media fixture on commercial, cable, and public television.
1. The Pundit's Decoding Function.
Why does the media insist on its daily dose of legal punditry?
Why not? Lawyers can decode legal jargon (for example, "what is a
subpoena duces tecum?") and explain the meaning of legal
principles and procedures ("what is a grand jury?") so that the
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media can translate legalese into comprehensible English. Legal
pundits perform this explanatory function so that they can help the
media interpret the significance of legislative, judicial, and
executive actions by placing them in their proper context.
When the pundit performs this decoding role competently, he
enhances the media's ability to gather and report legal news more
accurately, thereby contributing to the public's understanding of
the legal system. Most journalists are not lawyers and they need
help understanding what they are observing so they can write or
produce a coherent story that educates the public. Pundits who
perform this function for the radio and print media provide a
valuable service with very little public recognition, because most of
what they say to the reporter is not attributed to them. The pundit
receives his reward for doing this job well when he sees how his
input has improved the clarity and accuracy of the journalism that
results from lengthy phone conversations with reporters. The
pitfalls of serving this explanatory function are its time-consuming
nature and the inevitable occasions when the reporter does not
understand what the pundit is saying or quotes the pundit out of
context. Except for live radio, the pundit assumes such risks
because he does not control the ultimate editing process.
Putting aside the difficulty of explaining anything complex in a
ten-second sound bite,6 there is nothing problematic about national
celebrity pundits serving this decoding function on television,
provided that they have an adequate basis of factual and legal
knowledge to inform their analysis. While these two caveats about
legal and factual knowledge appear self-evident, many pundits
apply very modest definitions of what qualifies as an adequate
knowledge base.
To perform the explanatory role competently, the commentator
must be aware not only of general legal principles but their
definition in the particular jurisdiction. One troubling aspect of the
"national pundit" phenomenon is how frequently well-known
pundits misstate the law at issue because they have not practiced
in the particular jurisdiction nor have they researched local law to
find out whether it is consistent with the law in their own state.
During the Simpson case, Los Angeles-based commentators
frequently listened to East Coast pundits7 confidently give
See Part II.
The networks minimized this problem by hiring Los Angeles attorneys and law profes-
sors as legal consultants. However, some Los Angeles-based commentators also made egre-
gious mistakes. Covering the Simpson case was a fifll-time job that required the pundit not
only to listen to all the testimony and read all the motions but to anticipate legal issues that
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completely erroneous accounts of the California legal principles
implicated in the day's events.
2. The Pundit's Story-Telling Function: Assigning Credit,
Blame, and Responsibility.
Gavel-to-gavel televised coverage of O.J. Simpson's criminal
trial required constant expert commentary, if only to fill those
frequent and prolonged periods of dead air when the trial ground to
a halt and the inevitable sidebar conference began. The national
obsession with the Simpson case also fueled higher ratings for
evening infotainment programs like 20/20, Dateline, and Rivera
Live,8 which often featured panels of lawyers acting like Siskel and
Ebert, giving their thumbs up or down on the legal actors'
performances.
Both the "on-air" expert commentary during the broadcast of
live trials as well as the evening lawyer shows popularized the
pundit's "scorecard" and normative critique functions. Pundits
offered daily evaluations of how the lawyers were doing, what
strategies they were pursuing and their likely impact on the judge,
jurors, or public opinion. Pundits commented on witnesses'
credibility, defended or criticized judges for their legal rulings, and
predicted the outcomes of contested trial motions, appellate cases,
and jury verdicts. When juries returned verdicts, pundits
evaluated their accuracy and the public's likely reaction to them.
What explains this tendency of legal pundits to offer "play-by-
play" analysis of trials as if they were sporting contests? First, it is
easy to do without violating the media's objectivity norms.
Assessment of trial lawyers' tactical judgments is seen as
descriptive reporting that does not endorse the merits of the
advocate's position. Second, the scorecard focus accommodates
television's need to tell a dramatic story that will resonate with the
audience, even if what is transpiring inside the courtroom is far
from exciting. Third, evaluating the attorneys' strategic judgments
gives legal pundits the opportunity to impress viewers with their
own experiences and insights.
Some stories were worth telling. Televising Simpson's
preliminary hearing and suppression motion for five days gave
might arise in the future so that adequate legal research could be done ahead of time. Some of
the Los Angeles-based pundits apparently did not have the time or motivation to engage in
such research and "winged" it on the air instead of confessing their lack of knowledge on a
particular legal issue. See Paul Thaler, The Spectacle: Media and the Making of the O.J.
Simpson Story, 170-72 (Preager 1997).
' For a discussion of the unprecedented television coverage of the Simpson trial, see
32 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1998:
some of us an unprecedented opportunity to use the medium to
teach millions of citizens several valuable lessons about our
criminal justice system. Instead of viewing the Fourth Amendment
as an arbitrary "technicality," the national audience got a primer on
its meaning and importance as a protection of basic privacy
principles. When some pundits pointed out the implausibility of
police testimony denying O.J. Simpson's status as a potential
criminal suspect, they did more than simply suggest that police
may lie under oath. They explained how and why the police are
motivated to circumvent rules of procedural justice that may impair
their capacity to uncover the truth and bring the guilty to the bar of
justice. And Judge Kennedy-Powell's ruling denying the defense's
suppression motion? provided a valuable counterpoint to the
media's tendency to present the criminal justice system as a body of
technical rules that provide far too much protection to the guilty
while ignoring the rights of victims.
The legal commentary during Simpson's preliminary hearing
also illustrated how seamlessly the pundit's decoding work turns
into normative analysis and critique. I came away from the
experience convinced that pundits cannot perform the decoding
function competently on live television without offering some
normative analysis of specific legal actors, institutions, and legal
principles. TV legal pundits are storytellers who need to provide a
coherent context for the screen's video images.
3. Are Some Stories Not Worth Telling?
When pundits tell stories, they inevitably contribute to how
television attributes social meaning to the legal events it covers.
Sometimes, television is quite explicit about how it constructs social
meaning by asking pundits to criticize particular legal actors,
institutions, and principles. In answering such questions, pundits
offer narratives that attribute blame, credit, and responsibility.
Is there anything problematic about how celebrity legal
pundits contribute to television's construction of social meaning for
these high profile cases? What constitutes an adequate factual
analysis for such opinions? For example, should pundits without
first-hand knowledge concerning the investigation or trial answer
"scorecard" questions about the lawyer's strategy based on what
they have gleaned from media accounts? Should pundits without
such first-hand knowledge of the facts ever offer a normative
critique of the jury's verdict based on the reporter's summary of the
1994 WL 733990, *5 (Cal Mun Trans).
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"relevant" facts? And, finally, are some media questions such as
the calls for prediction and inquiries about improper jury
motivation better left unanswered even by pundits who have
observed the trial?
B. Lessons From Playing the Pundit's Role
When I first started offering legal commentary on high profile
cases, I believed such first-hand knowledge was not a prerequisite
as long as I trusted the reporter's account of the relevant facts. I
started answering such critical questions from reporters in the
Goetz case in a state of blissful ignorance about the perils of such
reliance and the agendas of the journalists who were asking the
questions.
Outraged by the jury's acquittal of Goetz on the serious charges
of attempted murder, the public wanted an explanation. Who
better to offer one than the famous law professor at Harvard who
had not observed the trial? But on those infrequent occasions when
Alan Dershowitz was not available, I got the call. I had no trouble
talking about a case I had not watched (ethical insight came to me
late in the game) because the media was asking me "general"
questions about the law of self-defense and the frequency of jury
nullification.
It did not dawn on me that my answers to questions about jury
nullification would help legitimate the media's take that only
nullification could explain why the jury's verdict disagreed with the
public's consensus concerning Goetz's guilt.10 If asked at the time to
defend my role, I would have offered the first definition of a pundit:
a teacher who is simply defining the legal principles of self-defense
and explaining why their application to the Goetz "facts" was
problematic. But, in fact, I was offering "critical" analysis of the
case, even though I did not fully appreciate an odd wrinkle about
how New York's "unreasonable self-defense" rules applied to
attempted murder and had not read the jury instructions that may
have confused the jurors about the mental state at issue. Nor did I
realize how the media would use my "analysis" to support its (and
the public's) interpretation of the verdict's social meaning.
Should a lawyer who has not observed the trial answer
evaluative questions about the performance of the lawyers, judge,
or jury? Many pundits see no problem doing so as long as they get
" For an explanation that suggests that jurors misunderstood the mental state for at-
tempted murder, see George Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense 186-88 (Free Press 1988).
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the facts from the reporter and wire service accounts. But there is
a danger relying on the media's version of the "facts." If the
reporter is not a lawyer herself, her version of the "facts" might
omit relevant information or include information that has not been
proven to the legal fact-finder's satisfaction. While the experienced
pundit can question the reporter to elicit more data, there is always
the danger that the pundit's opinion or analysis will rest on
mistaken factual presuppositions.
Should pundits satisfy the media's desire to anticipate the
outcome of trials and judicial decisions? Answering such predictive
questions in many contexts is a foors game, yet many lawyers are
willing to play it. It is one thing to evaluate the likelihood of
success of a legal motion where the pundit is aware of all the
testimony and applicable law. The pundit might guess wrong, but
his answer is based on his legal analysis of the merits of the
motion. It is quite another to predict whether an investigation will
end with an indictment or how the jury will vote once the case is
given to them."
How should the pundit respond when asked to evaluate the
jury's verdict. How can a pundit who did not observe the trial
assess the jury's performance, which includes making credibility
judgments about witnesses that the pundit never saw? How does
such a pundit know what constitutes a "reasonable doubt" in such
an empirical vacuum? Relying on the media's account of the
testimony, including the media's evaluation of the case's strengths
and weaknesses, is no substitute for one's own observation. 2
Rendering an opinion based on the media's evaluation of the
prosecutions merit will usually legitimate the media's
interpretation of what occurred unless the pundit has some other
normative axe to grind.
I learned this lesson during the Lorena Bobbitt trial. 3 After
" I learned how hard it is to avoid even the appearance of answering "predictive"
questions when I was asked by NBC's Dateline show whether Simpson was getting "pref-
erential" celebrity treatment by being allowed to surrender himself instead of being ar-
rested. I pointed out that such personal surrenders have occurred frequently in Los An-
geles when a wanted indigent suspect feared a police beating if arrested outside the me-
dia's glare. I then added wryly that Simpson "wasn't exactly a flight risk; after all, where
could he go where people would not recognize him?" ABC played only my sound bite an-
swer about the low risk of flight on national television the evening before the Bronco
chase. See Nightline (ABC television broadcast, June 17, 1994).
2 As I have argued elsewhere, even watching a trial on television is not the same thing
as attending that trial in the courtroom. See Arenella, 37 Santa Clara L Rev at 893-901
(cited in note 1).
"2 For a brief account of the Bobbitt affair, see David Margolick, Lorena Bobbitt Ac-
quitted in Mutilation of Husband, NY Times 1 (Jan 22, 1994).
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allegedly being abused by her husband during their marriage,
Bobbitt finally retaliated by cutting off his penis. Despite the
absence of any prior history of significant mental illness, the jury
found her insane and acquitted her. According to the media's
account of the trial testimony, the evidence of severe mental illness
was quite weak but the evidence of her victimization at her
husband's hands was quite compelling. Alan Dershowitz later
coined the term "abuse excuse" to describe his view of the defense's
strategy: present the jury with a fabricated claim of insanity which
the jury could use to excuse a victim for retaliating against her
victimizer.1
4
When CBS radio called me for my reaction to the verdict, I
gave it. After suggesting that jury verdicts normally deserved our
respect and deference because only the jurors saw the evidence and
deliberated, I proceeded to pay those jurors no respect at all by
suggesting they had mistakenly embraced the abuse excuse theme.
No one should be happy, I said, with a verdict that transformed her
willful, unjustifiable act of violent retaliation against her abuser
into the irresistible impulse of a crazed woman. We should not
excuse private vengeance. Nor does being a victim prevent one
from becoming a victimizer. Her husband did not deserve
mutilation but punishment by the state for his prior assaults.
Bobbitt should have been held accountable for her crime, with her
victimization being used to justify a lenient sentencing disposition.
I do not regret articulating and defending the moral principle
that past victimization should not justify or excuse violent
retaliation. Nonetheless, I was wrong to allege that the Bobbitt
jury had nuified the law, even if the mental defect testimony was
weak. I had no business accusing the jury of disregarding an
important moral and legal principle when I was not in a position to
know they had done so. I had a normative axe to grind and my
desire to wield it motivated an unsubstantiated allegation of jury
nullification.
What if the pundit watched the entire trial? Should legal
pundits then feel entitled to offer not only their informed opinion
that the jury reached the wrong result, but for the wrong reasons?
Many pundits who watched O.J. Simpson's criminal trial voiced
this opinion after the jury came back so quickly with its verdict of
acquittal. Was there anything problematic about legal pundits
making such charges of race-based jury nuification to the media?
" Alan M. Dershowitz, The Abuse Excuse and Other Cop-Outs, Sob Stories, and Eva-
sions of Responsibility (Little, Brown 1994).
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The danger here is that the pundit will too easily assume bad
faith on the jurors' part when the pundit believes, albeit in good
faith, that the evidence did not come close to establishing
reasonable doubt. What I find problematic about charges of jury
nullification in these cases is that the pundit who watched the trial
still did not go through the process of deliberating about the case
with the jurors. Watching the trial does give the pundit an
informed opinion about how he or she would have voted (at least
initially) in the jury room, because the pundit is in a position to
make an evaluation of the case's strengths and weaknesses. In
high-profile trials, however, the pundit has also been contaminated
by access to other inadmissible information that might color how
the pundit interprets the strengths and weaknesses of the actual
trial evidence. Finally, the pundit never acts like the trial juror
who must deliberate with eleven other human beings with very
different perspectives. For all of these reasons, legal pundits
should not make accusations of "bad faith" jury nullification 5 when
they lack relevant information about what was discussed inside the
jury room and where the factors that usually motivate such juror
misconduct are not present. 6
In offering these stories about why jury verdicts in high profile
,' Not all versions ofjury nullification presuppose jurors acting in "bad faith." Jury nulli-
fication can occur when the jury's criteria for evaluating the moral culpability of the criminal
defendant do not coincide with the law's criteria for attributing moral blame. To the extent
that we value lay participation in guilt determination because we want community notions of
justice to temper the literal application of legal norms to facts, this version ofjury nullification
respects the criminal law's attempt to link criminal responsibility to a demonstration of the
offender's moral culpability. Thus, in a case where a jury acquitted a defendant of a mercy
killing despite overwhelming proof of legal guilt, a pundit could explain how such a "nullifica-
tion" decision reflected community values of mercy towards the defendant. Other illustrations
of jury nullification that lack this "bad faith" element include cases where the jury believes
that the legislature's criminalization decision is mistaken (for example, criminalizing consen-
sual sexual activity between adults) or that the prosecutio's application of the crime to an
unusual set of facts was unwarranted - when, for example, a victim of a serious illness is
prosecuted for the possession of marijuana that the defendant uses for medicinal purposes to
alleviate pain or other undesirable symptoms of the illness. In contrast, accusing the O.J.
Simpson criminal jury of nullification conveys allegations of juror racism and bad faith. It
implies that in order to send a message to the Los Angeles Police Department, the Simpson
jurors acquitted someone they believed was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two vicious
murders.
" Classic examples of bad faith jury nullification occurred throughout the South during
the civil rights movement in the sixties where all-white juries acquitted white defendants of
crimes committed against black and white civil rights workers. When juries acquit defen-
dants because their racism prevents them from identifying with the humanity of the defen-
dant's victims, pundits should criticize such decisions because such verdicts do not warrant
any respect or deference from the community. For an explanation of why such charges were
not warranted in the Simpson criminal case, see Peter Arenella, Simms Memorial Lecture
Series - Explaining the Unexplainable: Analyzing the Simpson Verdict, 26 NM L Rev 349,
364-66(1996).
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trials do not reflect the "truth" that appeared so obvious to the
public, pundits impugn the integrity of individual juries and cast
doubt about the value of lay adjudication.17  By alleging jury
nullification, these pundits lend legitimacy to the media's
interpretation of the verdicts' meaning while simultaneously
concealing the media's social interpretive function from view.
Journalistic objectivity is maintained because it is the pundit who
offers the normative analysis, not the reporter, even though it is the
reporter (or editor) who chooses which pundit quotes are included
in the story and which ones are omitted.
Charges of jury nullification are too easy to make when jurors
return an unpopular verdict, and too damaging to the system to be
made without substantial evidence supporting such charges. 8
When pundits tell stories about jury nullification that attack the
good faith of jurors who have delivered unpopular verdicts, they
help legitimate the pernicious notion that trial juries should be
viewed as democratically accountable institutions whose verdicts
can be ignored when they differ from those rendered by the pundits
and the court of public opinion. Ironically, such commentary
suggests there is something fundamentally wrong with one of the
few aspects of our criminal justice system, the jury, that most
prosecutors and defense lawyers believe works reasonably well
most of the time.
This section has suggested that pundits who are not
observing a trial should refrain from engaging in ill-informed
scorecard analysis of daily proceedings. I have also argued that
even those pundits with direct access to the trial should refrain
from answering most predictive questions and should not charge
jurors with acting in bad faith when they return unpopular
verdicts, absent compelling evidence to support such charges.
The next section suggests that the nature of television as a live
" See, for example, Nightline (ABC television broadcast, August 26, 1997) (discuss-
ing concern of Americans about jury nullification).
" The civil rights cases discussed in note 16 provide an easy illustration of cases where
the historical and social context in which the prosecutions were embedded provided strong
support for allegations ofjuror bad faith. In an era where norms of political correctness have
deterred most people from making statements that acknowledge their racist tendencies, what
constitutes substantial evidence ofjuror bad faith and racism is a difficult question to answer.
When the predominately white Simi Valley jury acquitted the police officers in the Rodney
King beating case, several pundits criticized jurors for their "unconscious" racism. Such
charges are easy to make because they require no evidence of overt racist attitudes and can be
used whenever a criminal case raises racial issues that generate unpopular verdicts. Perhaps
such rhetoric should be avoided in favor of more substantive comments highlighting the im-
portance of having racially diverse juries handle cases that require the jury to appreciate
minority suspects' experiences with the LAPD.
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visual entertainment medium places further restraints on how
well competent legal pundits can use the medium to educate the
public about our legal system.
II. WHY THE MEDIUM MATTERS
Television has achieved the status of"meta-medium" - an
instrument that directs not only our knowledge of the
world but our knowledge of ways of knowing as well....
We do not doubt the reality of what we see on television,
are largely unaware of the special angle of vision it af-
fords.... Twenty years ago, the question Does television
shape culture or merely reflect it? held considerable inter-
est for many scholars and social critics. The question has
largely disappeared as television has gradually become our
culture.... This in turn, means that its epistemology goes
largely unnoticed ... television's way of knowing is un-
compromisingly hostile to [the print medium's model of
reasoned analytical discourse] . . . television's conversa-
tions promote incoherence and triviality... [it] speaks in
only one persistent voice - the voice of entertainment...
to enter the great television conversation, one American
cultural institution after another is learning to speak its
terms. Television, in other words, is transforming our cul-
ture into one vast arena for show business. 9
Legal pundits perform these functions - decoding, analysis,
scorekeeping, prediction, normative critique, and storytelling - for
all of the media. But TV legal pundits have far greater impact on
public perceptions of our legal system than pundits working for
radio and print media, because the majority of Americans rely
primarily on television for all their news and information."
Unfortunately, the constraints of television as an
instantaneous, visual, entertainment medium place severe limits
on the legal pundit's ability to educate the public about how our
legal system usually functions. Consider just a few of these
constraints.
9 Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Busi-
ness 78-80 (Penguin 1986).
' "Television is now indisputably the primary source of news for most Americans."
David Shaw, LA Times (April 19, 1996).
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A. The Aberrational High Profile Trial Becomes the Norm By
Which the Public Evaluates the System's Legitimacy
For the most part, what is news to the media about our
criminal justice system is what is out of the ordinary. It is not news
that thousands of defendants plead guilty to serious felonies every
day or that the acquittal rate for contested felonies is probably less
than one percent nationally. Nor is the ordinary criminal trial
newsworthy. By definition, the factors that make a case "high-
profile" are those unique and aberrational ingredients that
distinguish it from the run-of-the-mill prosecution.
Consider some of the elements that explain why a case elicits a
strong visceral public reaction that transforms it into a high-profile
trial at the local or national level: the notoriety of the defendant
(John DeLorean, O.J. Simpson), the special vulnerability or status
of the victims (the McMartins, Susan Smith, JonBenet Ramsey,
Louise Woodward), the unusual or shocking nature of the crimes
(Susan Smith, Lyle and Erik Menendez, Lorena Bobbitt, Jeffrey
Dahmer, Ted Kaczynski, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols), and
the presence of "hot button" social issues like child abuse, domestic
violence, police brutality, and race relations.
Television focuses on these high-profile cases because they
provide compelling entertainment value while simultaneously
rationalizing the viewing audience's curiosity because of the
presence of some important social issue. While pundits may point
out how exceptional each of these cases is, the point gets lost when
television serves up high profile trials as its daily fare for coverage.
Thus, the aberrational becomes the baseline by which the viewing
public measures the system's legitimacy. This is a no-win situation
for our criminal justice system because the same factors that make
the case aberrational increase the probability that the case's
outcome will not satisfy the majority's preferences. Very low
acquittal rates are unlikely to mollify a public hungry for crime
control that has O.J. Simpson and the Menendez brothers as its
poster boys.
B. The High-Profile Legal Event Must Be Presented in a Manner
that Maximizes its Visual Entertainment Value for the
Viewing Audience: "If It Bleeds, It Leads"
By its nature, a visual medium focuses our attention more on
40 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1998:
image, personality, and emotion than print and audio media, which
more directly engage our analytical thought processes. Consider
the difference between those who listened to the famous Kennedy-
Nixon presidential debate on radio and television: a majority of the
radio audience believed Nixon was the victor whereas a majority of
the viewing public concluded that JFK had won.2
The constraints of a visual entertainment medium have an
impact on how television covers high profile trials. First, television
will frequently lend undue importance to legally insignificant
events that have dramatic visual appeal. Thus, some of the heated
exchanges between members of the prosecution and defense team
that took place in the Simpson criminal trial when the jury was not
present triggered extensive media commentary on days when
important but subtle points in testimony before the jury escaped
television's scrutiny. Why? Dramatic video footage dictated the
content of the story that would be told on the evening news.
The absence of dramatic video when talking heads discuss
legal issues implicated in a given day's developments helps explain
why television frequently mimics the adversarial form of trials
when it structures such discussions. To create dramatic tension,
television frequently uses experts with diametrically opposed
positions to debate the merits of some legal controversy. These
lively debates between a prosecutor and defense counsel, in which
each speaker frequently interrupts the other as they compete for
the precious few seconds allotted to them, keep viewers awake even
if little of substance is ever said.
The media purports to maintain journalistic objectivity by
airing competing "defense" and "prosecution" viewpoints that
achieve ideological balance. The possibility that more thoughtful
substantive discussions might be generated by using individuals
who are looking for some common ground that might accommodate
these conflicting perspectives is rarely considered, because the
tendency of such discussions is to generate less compelling, C-Span-
like television with far lower audience ratings. Afier all, if the
viewing audience wants an informed and nuanced discussion of the
issues generated by the trial, they can get such accounts by
listening to NPR radio or by reading one of the country's leading
newspapers.
If one reads the transcripts of these stylized debates, one finds
that televised commentary on legal developments closely resembles
televised news: quick snappy sound bites and repartee but no
" Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960 293-294 (Atheneum 1961).
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prolonged moments of silence or pauses to consider the anchor's
questions. Verbal nuance and complexity usually do not play well
on television.22 Since anchors worry that the audience will get
impatient with protracted, complicated answers that offer no sharp
resolution, they often ask "prediction" questions that impose their
own sense of clarity and closure - who is winning and who is
losing? Will the race card strategy work or backfire?
Why do so many experienced trial lawyers happily answer
scorecard questions when most of them are not watching the trial
but are simply reading wire service reports? Why would
experienced trial attorneys who appreciate how difficult it is to
gauge a jury's sentiment be willing to offer their views about the
impact of a witness's testimony on the jury or the likelihood of a
conviction or acquittal? The simple answer is show business:
television's job is to entertain its viewers, and the pundits are the
show's performers. While the more knowledgeable pundits refuse
to make predictions, most are perfectly happy to critique the
performance of lawyers they have not observed and rulings they
have not read, because their critiques establish their legitimacy as
"experts" in the eyes of the audience. Television's epistemology
differs from the print medium: expertise is not based on what you
actually know but on what you appear to know and on how well you
present it. If you sound articulate and knowledgeable, and are
quick on your feet with winning sound bites, you qualify as a
pundit. If the media were to require a more demanding definition
of the pundit's knowledge basis, most celebrity pundits would be
put out of business, except for the occasional explanation of a legal
principle or procedure used in the case. Shows like Rivera Live
would be forced to rely solely on local legal experts with no viewer
name recognition.
Commercial television's coverage of trials mimics its coverage
of political campaigns; questions focus more on strategy than
substance. And questions of substance must be answered in a
manner that does not offend current conceptions of political
correctness. If the anchor asks the pundit, "will the race card
strategy work?," an answer that suggests the question itself is
misleading and unhelpful'3 is not a viable option for the pundit who
Anyone who has watched Charlie Rose may take exception to this comment. But it is
no accident that the visual component of that show is muted so that the audience can focus on
the substance of what the speakers are saying, not on the images presented.
For a critique of how the media mishandled issues of race and racism by lumping them
together under the rubric "race card," see Peter Arenella, Foreword; O.J. Lessons, 69 S Cal L
Rev 1233, 1258-63 (1996).
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wants to be asked back. Such a response will undermine the
anchor's credibility with her viewers.
C, Personality and Character Resonate Better with the Viewing
Audience in a Visual Medium than in a Print or Audio Me-
dium
Many others have pointed out how television news has
indulged in the cult of celebrity and personality by offering a
"People Magazine" view of the world where public figures are built
up and torn down for our viewing pleasure. One can certainly see
evidence of this tendency in how television covers high profile legal
events. Barbara Walters and Diane Sawyer compete for who will
air the first in-depth interview with the high profile counsel dujour
or key government witness. Reputations of trial lawyers are built
up beyond realistic expectations (witness the "Dream Team"
references to O.J. Simpson's criminal defense team) only to be
followed by expos6s where we learn about intimate and
embarrassing details of the lawyer's personal life (Johnnie
Cochrane's relations with a former lover) that have absolutely no
bearing on his capacity to represent his client. Trial judges are put
on the cover of national magazines and become the butt of
comedians' jokes. A witness like Kato Kaelin becomes a national
obsession because his looks, physical mannerisms, and style of
speaking elicits a visceral reaction from the television audience.
Fred Goldman's angry press conferences where he denounced the
defense for suggesting a police conspiracy triggered intemperate
faxes from viewers who were annoyed at the intensity of his grief
and anger. Apparently, his fury interfered with their viewing
pleasure.
D. Television Coverage of High-Profile Trials Erodes the Bound-
ary Demarcating the Court of Law from Mass Public Opinion
by Converting the Former into a Forum of Entertainment for
the Latter
What exactly is the problem with such reactions? There is
nothing wrong with a trial having entertainment value. In an
earlier era, many Americans would attend criminal trials in part
for their dramatic appeal. A trial can provide a form of public
theatre that all of us can afford. Nor is there anything wrong with
legal commentary being done in an entertaining manner. As any
teacher knows, humor is a wonderful pedagogical tool and no
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learning occurs if you are boring your audience. The problem arises
when the entertainment value of a legal event becomes the
dominant mode of coverage, the primary way of thinking and
talking about it. As Neil Postman observed:
The problem is not that television presents us with enter-
taining subject matter but that all subject matter is pre-
sented as entertaining. Entertainment is the supra-
ideology of all discourse on television. No matter what is
depicted or from what point of view, the overarching pre-
sumption is that it is there for our amusement and pleas-
ure.
24
Viewing the trial in this manner interferes with the trial's
capacity to provide the community with an opportunity for
appropriate community catharsis. The television audience tends to
forget the human tragedy it is witnessing as the trial merges with
the other soap operas presented for the audience's viewing
pleasure. Reducing all legal institutional issues into questions of
character and personality can also have a corrosive impact on the
conduct of the legal actors involved in the proceedings. Judges
begin to respond to the media pressures by changing their
courtroom demeanor and conduct, as Judge Ito did during the
Simpson criminal trial after taking heat for giving the defense too
much slack. Defense lawyers feel compelled to defend their ethics
to a hostile press that has little understanding of or tolerance for
the defense role in our criminal justice system.
One response to these concerns is to reply that these are the
natural costs of a free media doing its job to ensure that legal actors
and institutions remain accountable to the will of the people. But
this response actually restates the problem, because legal actors in
the courtroom are not supposed to be directly accountable to the
will of the people. Paul Gerwitz eloquently states the law's
dilemma:
Law is all about human life, yet struggles to keep life at
bay. This is especially true of the criminal trial. With the
public typically ranking crime our country's most impor-
tant problem, the criminal trial reflects and ignites large
passions. Yet it usually seeks to exclude much of that
passion from its stage as the trial proceeds with its struc-
' Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death at 87 (cited in note 19).
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tured process of legal proof and judgement.
Maintaining the boundary between the courtroom and or-
dinary life is a central part of what legal process is all
about. Distinctive legal rules of procedure, jurisdiction,
and evidence insist upon and define law's autonomous
character - indeed, constitute the very basis of a court's
authority. The mob may have their faces pressed hard
against the courtroom windows, but the achievement of
the trial is to keep those forces at bay.... But there is
always a struggle between this idealized vision of the law
- which proclaims that law is and must be separate from
politics, passion, and public resistance - and the relent-
less incursion of the tumult of ordinary lifeY
Legal pundits further erode this distinction between the
courtroom and mass public opinion by using the trial as a civics
lesson about how public policy should be formulated to respond to
hot-button social issues implicated in the trial, and by legitimating
public criticism of unpopular jury verdicts. There is an irony here.
To the extent that the public takes the pundits' commentary
seriously and looks to the trial as something more than
entertainment, it begins to see the criminal trial as the appropriate
forum to illustrate valuable lessons about how society should
respond to social issues like racism and domestic violence. In short,
the public loses sight of the trial's main function of deciding guilt or
innocence, as pundits criticize the trial's participants for not being
more sensitive to the social costs of their behavior, even when their
conduct is dictated by their legal roles.
Again, the criminal justice system is in a lose-lose situation:
the high profile trial's entertainment value interferes with some of
the functions the trial is supposed to serve. Aware of this tendency
to trivialize what is legally and socially significant, pundits will
remind the public of the important social issues embedded in the
trial, such as society's response to domestic violence or police
racism. But then the public will quickly see that the media's and
pundits' treatment of these issues does not mimic how the trial
handles them. While the media fully explored all of the allegations
of domestic violence in the Simpson case, rules of evidence and
Paul Gerwitz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial, in
Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, eds, Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law 135
(Yale 1996).
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discovery sanctions prevented the prosecution from presenting the
same picture of domestic violence in the courtroom. The public's
reaction was to condemn the trial because it did not provide an
appropriate airing of the evidence or an appropriate resolution of
the allegation's significance to the charge of murder. But the
public's frustration with the trial on these grounds rests on a faulty
premise: that our criminal trials are the appropriate forum for a
full airing of all social grievances that might have some bearing on
the case and that such trials can also provide an appropriate social
remedy.
These costs might be more palatable if TV legal pundits did a
better job of educating the public about the complexities and
nuances of the legal issues implicated in the proceedings. But
television's lingua franca, the sound bite, severely limits the
intelligibility of most pundits' analyses.
E. The Problem of Sound-Bite Analysis: the Abuse Excuse in
Menendez
I assume most Americans were outraged and confused by the
inability of two Californian juries to convict the Menendez brothers
of murder at their first trial.26 After all, the brothers intentionally
and brutally slaughtered their parents and then lied about it.2
7
Few credited their subsequent claims of abuse and most assumed
these teenagers did not need to kill their parents to solve whatever
problem they were having with them. One could almost hear the
sighs of relief across America when both brothers were convicted of
first degree murder at their retrial.
How did television and its legal pundits explain this case to the
public? Relying on Alan Dershowitz's slogan, "the abuse excuse,'
the networks and local television: highlighted those pundits who
waxed eloquent about how our criminal justice system was eroding
norms of moral accountability by privileging such excuses. The
media commentary suggested our courtrooms were being flooded by
cases where defendants sought to negate their responsibility by
shifting blame from themselves to their victimizers.
If such an abuse excuse existed in theory or in practice, its
factual and normative premises would indeed be indefensible.
Being an adult victim of abuse does not, by itself, unduly impair
' For a discussion of the Menendez case and the abuse excuse, see Peter Arenella,
Demystifying the Abuse Excuse: Is There One?, 19 Harv J L & Pub Pol 703, 706-09 (1996).
Id.
See Dershowitz, Abuse Excuse (cited in note 14).
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one's moral capacities.29 Nor does victimhood destroy one's moral
duty not to use unnecessary violence against one's victimizer. But
there are several problems with pundits' use of this catchy label to
describe what was at issue in the Menendez case.
First, there is no "pure"-abuse excuse in the criminal law. The
only excuse defense that negates the defendant's responsibility for
his criminal act is the insanity defense, and most abuse-related
claims of insanity fail. Instead of informing the public about the
rarity of such defenses, the media focused on the one exceptional
example of a successful insanity defense that relied heavily on an
abuse excuse rationale - the Lorena Bobbitt case. The media did
not tell the public that the insanity defense is only raised in 2% of
cases and most of these defenses are rejected." For every Lorena
Bobbitt there are a hundred Jeffrey Dahmers - severely
disordered killers who are found responsible for their acts despite
their credible claims of insanity. In short, the abuse excuse as
portrayed by the media is not a significant problem.
To make matters worse, the media never should have used the
Menendez brothers as the abuse excuse poster boys because their
defense was actually designed to reduce their criminal liability
from murder to manslaughter. The issue in serious dispute was
their motive for the killings because their motivation affected the
degree of guilt the law attached to their crimes. If they killed their
parents to get their money, they were guilty of first degree murder.
If they shot their parents because they believed, however
unreasonably, that their parents were about to kill them that
evening, they were guilty of voluntary manslaughter. One does not
have to believe their story to understand that their legal claim of
unreasonable self-defense concedes criminal responsibility for
manslaughter. 1 I wonder how many Americans understood from
the media accounts that only the degree of their guilt was
' For an account of the qualities of a morally responsible agent, see Peter Arenella,
Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral
Accountability, 39 UCLA L Rev 1511, 1609 (1990).
' The media finally conveyed the low likelihood of success in insanity defenses when it
covered the Unabomber case. See, for example, Gordon Witkin, What Does it Take to be
Crazy?, US News & World Rep 7 (Jan 12, 1998); Daniel Klaidman and Patricia King, Suicide
Mission, Newsweek 22 (Jan 19, 1998). Ironically, what the media did not report to the public
was that Ted Kaczynski's defense team did not want to raise an insanity defense challenging
his criminal responsibility; they wanted instead to raise a diminished capacity defense at the
guilt phase as a precursor to using evidence of his mental illness at the penalty phase in order
to save his life.
" See Model Penal Code § 3.09 (1985), (providing that one who acts in unreasonable
self-defense by making a reckless mistake as to the necessity of using force may be liable
for a crime of recklessness (manslaughter)).
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realistically at stake in the first trial, or that the reason the juries
deadlocked in that trial was that some of the jurors wanted first
degree murder and others held out for voluntary manslaughter? Of
course, there are legitimate issues to discuss about the nature and
scope of the law's unreasonable self-defense doctrine in cases where
no objective facts suggest an attack was imminent, but these issues
were not raised by the media's discourse about abuse excuses
eroding norms of accountability.
The irony here is that while the public believes the criminal
law is weakening norms of moral accountability by unduly
welcoming claims of victimization, the reality is just the opposite.
Our criminal law holds most criminal defendants fully accountable
for their criminal acts despite evidence of significant impairment of
their moral capacities resulting from childhood victimization. If the
media paid attention to ordinary murder prosecutions and focused
on the background of those killers who populate death row, they
would discover serious and undisputed evidence of early abuse and
victimization that did not diminish the killers' culpability in the
eyes of the criminal law.32
Why did television - including Nightline, which ran a special
show on the abuse excuse after the first juries were unable to reach
a verdict33 - do such a bad job explaining what was really at issue
in this case? Consider who gets to participate in televised debates
about the abuse excuse. How does one get anointed as an "expert"
pundit? Television rewards those opinion-makers who can offer
simplistic sound bite accounts of problems and their solutions.
Talking about the abuse excuse communicates something quickly to
the television viewer, even if it is misleading. But how is a legal
pundit going to give a comprehensible sound bite that describes the
doctrine of unreasonable self-defense as a partial excuse that does
not destroy accountability but reduces culpability? Who is going to
understand that bite?
I remember doing interviews for ABC News during the
Menendez trial where I deliberately refused to use the abuse excuse
label because of its misleading potential. Those interviews were
never aired because my attempts to explain unreasonable self-
defense confused the reporters who had already accepted the guilt-
defeating paradigm version of the defense. Moreover, the editors
were concerned that all of my sound bites lasted longer than fifteen
seconds. In a television news spot that has allotted 70 seconds to
See Arenella, 19 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 707-08 (cited in note 26).
Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Feb 4, 1994).
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cover the entire story of that day's developments, no talking head is
going to get the luxury of a twenty-five-second sound bite to explain
what is at issue.
Television is unmatched in its immediacy, intimacy, and
drama, but it rewards only digestible sound bites and instant
reaction. It rarely permits time for reflection or tolerates multi-
faceted, nuanced responses.'
F. Conventional Public Wisdom as the Primary Source for Tele-
vision's Construction of Social Meaning: the Simpson Case
and the Race Card
The problem with television's coverage of high profile cases is
not simply one of time. Even if I had been given twenty-five
seconds to explain unreasonable self-defense, I would likely have
confused the viewing audience because my sound bite would have
been so inconsistent with the public's conventional wisdom about
what was at stake in that case. To an extent not fully appreciated
by critics of television news who mistakenly claim it is infected with
liberal political bias, television frames legal issues in a manner that
is consistent with the publies conventional wisdom about what is
transpiring in the courtroom. In short, television tends to embrace
conventional public wisdom about legal events and then reflect that
wisdom back onto the public, thereby legitimating public
constructions of social meaning as "objective reality."
To illustrate this thesis, consider how television handled the
issue of race in the Simpson case. From the trial's outset, the
subtext to the media's treatment of the case was whether a
predominately black jury would rise above feelings of racial
solidarity and racial payback from the Rodney King episode and do
the right thing by convicting an obviously guilty but very famous
black defendant. This subtext was made explicit by the media's use
of the race card metaphor to describe all of the complicated ways
that race played a role in the case.
I have written elsewhere explaining why the race card
metaphor is inapt because it conceals from view the positive ways
that race can affect jury deliberations.35 In our culture, race helps
define one's social experience and having different social
experiences represented on the jury enhances the jurors' collective
While the print media usually do a better job handling complexity, shading, and
nuance, they did not distinguish themselves in their coverage of the Menendez trials.
See Arenella, 69 S Cal L Rev at 1262-63 (cited in note 23).
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ability to determine who is telling the truth and who is not." The
law promotes racially diverse juries in part because it understands
the positive role race can play, but this view of race's impact on the
Simpson jury was not communicated to the public by the media's
use of the race card label. Nor was there much discussion about
how the black jurors' social experiences might have aided their
credibility determination that Mark Fuhrman and other officers
lied to them under oath. The Fuhrman tapes were a revelation for
the white media and the one white woman juror; they simply
confirmed what the black jurors had already sensed when they
listened to Fuhrman testify during his cross-examination by F. Lee
Bailey.
Admittedly, race also played a negative role in the case. For
the minority jurors possessing racially-tinged experiences with
police, police conspiracies and police misconduct may have
appeared all too plausible. Perhaps it became too easy for some of
the jurors to believe in every defense allegation of police misconduct
regardless of the caliber of the evidence supporting the allegation.
Race and gender might also have played a negative role in how
some of the jurors responded to the domestic violence evidence.
In short, race played a complicated role in the case that cut in
many different directions. But the media's treatment of race via
the pejorative race card label simply reified the white public's
initial fear and then belief that the verdict was all about racial
solidarity and racial payback.
I believe the media, and especially television, played a very
important role in legitimizing the public's conventional wisdom
about the case, including the nullification account of the jury's
verdict. Johnnie Cochrane appeared to legitimate those fears when
he asked the jury to send a message to the Los Angeles Police
Department and compared Mark Fuhrman to Adolf Hitler. When
the jury quickly reached its verdict of acquittal, television showed
graphic pictures of white women crying and blacks rejoicing over
the verdict. The conclusion that race and not "reasonable doubt"
produced the verdict seemed obvious: pictures don't lie and one of
the defense team even admitted after the verdict that the defense
"had played the race card from the bottom of the deck."37
All of the networks used the same "send a message" and
See Deborah A. Ramirez, How Affirmative Jury Selection Enhances Both the Delib-
erative Ideal and the Diversity of the Jury, 1998 U Chi Legal F 161.
Eric Malnic, The Simpson Verdicts: Shapiro Trades Criticism with Cochran and
Bailey, Los Angeles Times A3 (Oct 4, 1995) (reporting Robert Shapiro's remark).
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"Hitler-Fuhrman" sound bites from the closing argument on their
nightly news programs. None of them used a later sound bite
where Cochrane linked his "send a message" theme to reliability
problems with the prosecution's evidence. Nor did the networks
use any sound bites from Barry Sheck's masterful closing
argument, which pulled together all of the themes of the defenses
attack on the reliability of the prosecution's evidence. All of the
networks showed the same pictures of groups of whites and blacks
reacting so differently to the announcement of the verdicts. None of
the networks took the time to put those pictures into a context that
might explain them as anything other than confirmation of what
the white public had feared from the beginning.
The racially-divided reactions to the verdict were news, but
those pictures required significant explanation and analysis, not
fifteen-second sound bites about the court of public opinion
displaying its vote as the thirteenth juror. I am referring to my
own comment on ABC News right after the verdict. I was making a
descriptive point about the court of public opinion, not a normative
one concerning the desirability of the public acting like the
thirteenth juror. If given more time, I would have made this
distinction clear and tried to put those pictures in a context that did
not aggravate racial tensions.
Several points should have been made about those pictures. To
list a few: some whites understood that there were major problems
with the evidence; not all African Americans believed in Sinpson'sinnocence, but many had "reasonable doubts" because of the police
misconduct that occurred in this case; and others who believed
Simpson was guilty were still gratified to see that a racially diverse
jury shared their mistrust of the police.
Would any pundit's words have changed the meaning that so
many white Americans initially attributed to the verdict? I doubt
it. The power of television to shape popular perceptions about the
verdicts meaning is illustrated in part by the absence of those
factors that would make a jury nullification story plausible. Jury
nullification usually occurs when the jury has problems with the
crime itself, the discriminatory application of a crime to a
disadvantaged group, or believes the victim of the crime provoked
its commission."8 None of these factors applied to the Simpson
case.
Nor was this a case where the jury could not identify with the
humanity of the victims. All of the jurors were clearly horrified by
See note 15.
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the brutality of the two murders and expressed sympathy for the
victims' families. The media accurately reported that some jurors
were moved to tears when they first saw the grisly photos of the
two victims. Jurors who appreciate the victims' humanity and the
killer's brutality would not acquit someone they believed beyond a
reasonable doubt was guilty just to send a message about police
misconduct.
CONCLUSION
Television's interpretive power is only enhanced by the fact that
it does not create social meaning out of whole cloth. It takes a
partial truth from the trial's dynamics and a complete truth about
popular conventional wisdom and then reflects those truths back
upon the public; thereby legitimating it as "objective."
So what should the "competent" and "ethical" legal expert do if
he believes commercial television can occasionally educate the
public, but its constraints as a visual entertainment medium make
it a bad bet more often than not? One option is to ignore that
medium and offer commentary only to the press and radio. The
problem, of course, is that most Americans no longer read their
newspapers and rely on television for all of their news and
information. That simple fact explains the temptation to follow
Professor Pillsbury's good advice, which is to use television when it
suits the expertes purposes but not to play television's game:
The expert has a powerful defense against all forms of
trivilization: refusing to play the game. The expert can re-
sist the temptation to assume total intellectual authority
and admit to limitations of knowledge and insight. When
the media insists on a simplistic question, the expert may
respond by emphasizing the complexities involved. When
conflict is sought, the expert may emphasize points of
agreement as well as disagreement. When the law is pre-
sented as a game, the expert may remind viewers of the
real stakes involved. Sometimes, the expert must be
willing to take more drastic action. The expert must be
willing to walk - ready to walk off the network set, away
from the talk show appearance, or to decline to answer the
reporter's inquiry."
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Why Are We Ignored? The Peculiar Place of Experts in the Current
Debate About Crime and Justice, 31 Crim L Bull 305,335 (1995).
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I have been following that advice since the Simpson case.
Consequently, I have turned down most requests to appear on
television except for some commentary on the Unabomber case
that related to my own scholarship on mental disability law. The
question remains, however, whether mainstream commercial
television ever realistically permits the competent and ethical
pundit to pursue his own educational or normative agenda in a
manner that is not ultimately self-defeating.
